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Abstract. A family of algorithms provides a formalization of how the basic
one-round electoral systems — highest average and largest remainders, sin-
gle transferable vote and single non-transferable vote systems — proceed in
transforming votes into seats. In this way the basic one-round electoral sys-
tems are parametrized with the four parameters n (size of the constituency),
m (size of the nomination lists), ck (a factor providing the electoral formula)
and l (signed election threshold). The parametrization reveals that the most
important electoral systems have a common basic structure.
1. Introduction
The study of electoral systems has developed into a rich and diverse …eld of
research with important contributions coming from several disciplines including
political science, philosophy, mathematics, and economics. Such studies, inter alia,
address issues of classi…cation, investigate the direct and indirect e¤ects of di¤erent
electoral systems, and evaluate existing and ideal type electoral systems against
a large number of normatively or analytically relevant criteria. All these research
questions are conditional on the understanding of the actual working of electoral
systems. Consequently, the literature is rich in work highlighting how di¤erent
systems translate votes into seats. While comparative studies typically calculate
the e¤ects of variation in the electoral systems’ individual components (v. Gal-
lagher and Mitchell [3], Gallagher and Mitchell [4], Lijphart [7], Nohlen [8], Rae
[9], Taagepera and Shugart [11]), country studies mostly demonstrate how these
components interact to produce the electoral outcomes (v. Bowler and Grofman
[1], Grofman and Lijphart [5] and the country chapters in Gallagher and Mitchell
[2]). Common to most such endeavour is detailed description of institutional de-
tail. Clearly, this is essential for understanding individual cases, illustrating the
empirical range of various manifestations of the individual components of electoral
systems, and reaching out to political practitioners. In this paper we take a di¤er-
ent perspective at describing how electoral systems work that puts the emphasis on
parsimony.
The political science literature beginning with the seminal study of Rae [9] has
parsimoniously reduced the complexity of real world electoral systems to their core
components. Given its focus on real world e¤ects, it has, however, eschewed the for-
malization of how electoral systems work. Yet, although it is not a classic research
question per se, formalization is important as the best way to avoid ambiguity. Pro-
viding formalization of how electoral systems work is the …rst goal of the present
paper. Formalization also allows for seeing communalities of di¤erent classes of
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electoral systems. While the literature generally treats Rae’s categorical electoral
systems (i.e., closed list systems) and ordinal electoral systems (where the voter
can rank in the ballot paper the candidates, irrespective of their party, in any or-
der he/she wishes) as systems with fundamentally di¤erent mechanisms to allocate
seats, formalization allows to bringing these types into one common framework.
We approach algorithmically the basic types of electoral system in the election
of national parliaments. Our focus is on structural characteristics of the electoral
systems, disregarding detail and exceptions (e.g. to allow national minority repre-
sentation). In a general (pre-mathematical) sense, algorithms are precise procedures
designed to solve a problem, be it locating a book in a library or, as in our case, al-
locating a given number of parliamentary seats among the contenders of elections.
An algorithm has to satisfy several criteria including universality (it must work
in all speci…c applications), de…niteness (its steps must be clearly de…ned in their
sequence and content), and …niteness (it must terminate after a …nite number of
steps and deliver a result).
By reducing how electoral systems transmite votes into seats to an algorithmic
scheme, it becomes clear how every particular system is determined by the choice
of very few parameters. In this sense, our analysis is in the wake of the seminal
contribution of Rae [9], where the stylized facts of reality are pro…led, and the
famous three ”electoral law variables” (ballot structure, electoral district size and
electoral formula) are considered.
In this paper we formalize these three variables in mathematical terms, adding a
forth variable, the election threshold, already a ”secondary variable” in Rae [9]. By
introducing a general scheme of algorithms, the four resulting variables, adequately
modi…ed, become parameters determining all the basic one-round electoral systems.
Hereafter under the ”basic one-round electoral systems” the following are referred
to: (1) the standard closed list systems, i.e. highest average and largest remain-
ders (including …rst-past-the-post); (2) single transferable vote systems (including
preferential voting); (3) single non-transferable vote systems.
A parametrization is more than a classi…cation. In a parametrization of elec-
toral systems, if the values of all the parameters are given, an electoral system is
univocally determined. Thus the common structure of these electoral systems is
revealed, and both the theoretical and the empirical work are made easier. The
comparison between parametric a non-parametric statistics illustrates su¢ciently
to which extent parametrization facilitates scienti…c analysis and evaluation.
Can the basic one-round electoral systems be parametrized? Have they some
common structure? The answer to both questions is a¢rmative.
The general framework and notation are introduced in Section 2. Section 3
pro…les brie‡y the four parameters. The general scheme of algorithms is explained
in Section 4: it encompasses all the procedures applied in the basic one-round
electoral systems to transform votes into seats.
Section 5 considers the two standard sorts of closed list systems, highest average
and largest remainders, as determined by the parameters.
The parameters determining ordinal single transferable vote systems are dealed
with in Section 6. In a closed list electoral system (including the …rst-past-the
post system), the ballots contain a limited amount of information, which does not
seem in principle di¢cult to process to obtain the overall result of the vote. But
if the ballots contain more information, as in ordinal systems, how the manifold
preferences of the voters can be processed to obtain a result? A simpli…cation
AN ALGORITHMIC APPROACH TO ONE-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 3
(or ”interpretation”) of the preferences expressed in the ballot papers has to be
implemented, in a way pre-determined by the electoral system. Two ideas, in fact
developed from closed list systems, appear in the general scheme of algorithms. On
the one hand, the candidates ranked lower in a ballot paper ”weigh” less in the
counting. On the other hand, the candidates are eliminated through thresholds: in
closed list systems there is often a threshold of entry (if a list is below this threshold,
all the members of the list are eliminated); in ordinal systems we introduce an
election threshold acting in a more complex way (based on lowering the ”weight”
of the candidates ranked lower). In contrast with closed list systems, in ordinal
systems, with the ballots having more information, we have somebody to resort to
if a candidate is eliminated: the second choice is considered in the ballots where
the …rst choice candidate has been eliminated (and so on if the second choice is
eliminated...).
The article considers two structural parameters and two counting parameters.
The two structural parameters are n (size of the constituency) and m (size of the
nomination lists). In the nomination of candidates the political parties can take
more or less decision power, and the voter be left with less or more of it; as explained
below, parameter m (a positive integer) measures this characteristic of an electoral
system. We shall also introduce the two counting parameters ck (factor providing
the electoral formula) and l (signed (i.e. with the sign + or the sign -) election
threshold). The general scheme of algorithms is so written that when the four
parameters are …xed, a concrete electoral system is determined. The article shows
that all the basic one-round electoral systems are represented as resulting from
values of these parameters.
2. General framework
We consider a constituency with n seats. There is a set S of eligible candidates;
we suppose that the number of candidates, jSj, is greater than or equal to the
magnitude of the constituency: jSj ¸ n.
Each ballot contains an ordered list of at most jSj candidates. Let S¤ be the set
of (ordered) lists formed by at most jSj di¤erent elements of S; according to the
relevant electoral system, perhaps not all these lists are admissible to be chosen by
the voters. Let T µ S¤ be the set of those lists that are allowed to be written on a
ballot. For example, in a closed list system, only the lists proposed by the parties
that have met the requirements for candidacy are in T .
As an example, suppose a constituency where 3 candidates must be chosen (n =
3). Further, 12 candidates take part in the election, belonging to 4 parties (3
candidates for each party); there are no independent candidates. Thus there are 12
elements in S. In the case of an ordinal electoral system, the 3 candidates of each
party may be chosen individually, and the elector is free to place in his/her ballot
paper 12 names, irrespective of party, in any order. Therefore T has 12! elements,
a huge number. In contrast, in the case of a closed list system, T has only 4
elements: the voter may choose only among 4 lists of candidates, already prepared
by the political parties. As for the design of the electoral system, processing the
declared wishes of the voters is easier when they have 4 options than when they
have 12!; in the end, the electoral system must provide as a result just 3 names.
Another question is whether the voters have the time and willingness to decide
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among 12! options. In closed list systems, a large amount of the decision power
passes from the voters to the political parties.
The electoral system determines whether the candidates may stand for election
individually or they are to be nominated within set lists of candidates. Let m be
the number of candidates of such set nomination lists as prescribed by the electoral
system. The voter must include complete nomination lists as blocks in the ballot
paper. In practice, either m = 1 (each candidate stands individually) or m = n
(the nomination lists must have as many candidates as seats to be assigned).
The smaller is m, then the larger is T , and the more information is provided
by the voter (by choosing among more options). The maximum information is
provided if m = 1 (and thus T = S¤); for this to be practicable, the magnitude of
the constituency should be small. The minimum information corresponds to closed
lists.
After the election, the set B of valid ballots is obtained. After counting, the …nal
outcome of the election in the constituency is the set E of elected candidates.
We summarize the basic notation:
² n: number of seats of the constituency
² S: set of eligible candidates (we assume jSj ¸ n)
² m: number of candidates in each nomination list
(now T µ S¤ is the set of admissible contents of ballots, where S¤ is the set
of (ordered) lists formed by at most jSj di¤erent elements of S)
² B: set of valid ballots.
² E: set of elected candidates.
The counting process is iterative; at the end of each iteration one candidate
is either selected or eliminated. At the beginning E contains no candidate (i.e.
E = ;). During the implementation of the algorithm, E increases (as the candidates
are selected) and S decreases (as the candidates are selected or eliminated). Thus
if candidate k is selected, then it is added to E and removed from S:
E Ã E [ fkg, S Ã S » fkg
If candidate h is eliminated, it is removed from S:
S Ã S » fhg
In each iteration only the …rst candidate in the ballot (after all the candidates
already selected or eliminated are disregarded) is considered for selection. Given an
eligible candidate s 2 S, we denote by Bs µ B the set of those ballots in which s
is the top candidate among those still in S (i.e. among those not yet selected or
eliminated); note that Bs may change in every iteration, as S changes.
Every ballot b 2 B has a weight ½b. This weight is initially 1, and then the
weight decreases as candidates listed in the ballot are selected.
In each iteration we begin by counting the votes zs of every candidate s 2 S, i.e.
the weighted number of ballots in which s is the top candidate (among those not
yet selected or eliminated):
zs Ã
X
b2Bs
½b , for every s 2 S
(If Bs = ;, it applies the usual convention that the value of the empty sum is zero).
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3. Parameters
There are two sorts of parameters:
(i) Structural parameters, namely:
(1) n, the size of the constituency. It is a positive integer. It corresponds to the
electoral district size of Rae [9].
(2) m, the size of the nomination lists. It is a positive integer (in practice, 1 or
n). The larger is m, the more information is provided in the nomination process
(and the less information is left to be provided by the ballot paper).
From m results T µ S¤, the set of admissible contents of the ballots, which
corresponds to the ballot structure of Rae [9]. The ballots are ordered lists of
candidates. T indicates which lists of at most jSj candidates are allowed to be
included in a ballot. The set of feasible lists can be small (closed list systems) or
large (ordinal systems), i.e., the ballot provides less or more information.
(ii) Counting parameters, determining the procedure to assign the seats from the
number of ballots where the candidates appear and their positions in these ballots.
We consider here two parameters (see next section):
(3) ck, the factor reducing the ”weight” of the candidates ranked lower than
candidate k in the ballot paper. It is a function of k and (perhaps) of the weighted
number of ballots zk. It corresponds to the electoral formula of Rae [9].
(4) l, the election threshold, with a preceding sign. We leave it positive (l > 0)
in closed list systems, and add a minus sign in ordinal systems (thus l < 0); if l = 0
no threshold is applied. All in all, the threshold is the absolute value jlj of l. In
Rae [9] the election threshold was not considered among the three main variables
of electoral systems, but among the secondary variables.
4. The general scheme of algorithms
In each iteration of the algorithms, the only information taken from each ballot
is the …rst-choice (the …rst element of the list, after all the candidates already
selected or eliminated are disregarded). Thus the candidate k with the highest
weighted number of ballots is pre-selected:
k Ã arg maxfzs; s 2 Sg
(Some pre-determined procedure must be used to break the ties, if any, i.e. in case
that jarg max fzs; s 2 Sgj > 1).
Once candidate k is determined, the possibility of elimination of candidates is
considered. In closed list systems there is often a threshold (represented by para-
meter l); if a list is below this threshold, all the members of the list are eliminated.
In ordinal single transferable vote systems we introduce an election threshold (rep-
resented, with a minus sign, by parameter l), acting in a more complex way (based
on lowering the ”weight” of the candidates ranked lower). But an essential point
is that in ordinal systems if a candidate is eliminated this does not mean that all
the ballot papers including this candidate become ine¤ectual. The ballots contain
more information than in closed list systems. In the ballots where the …rst choice
candidate has been eliminated, the second choice is considered instead in single
transferable vote systems (and so on if the second choice is eliminated...).
Formally, for every electoral system there is a (signed) threshold parameter l,
positive (closed list systems), zero (no threshold is applied) or negative (ordinal
single transferable vote systems). A threshold may be applied to the total number
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of ballots jBkj or to the weighted sum zk; in the …rst case the threshold is l and in
the second ¡l. The threshold l is applied on jBkj if l > 0, and the threshold ¡l is
applied on zk if l < 0. If jBkj < l, then candidate k is eliminated:
S Ã S » fkg
If this not the case, the ¡l test follows. If zk < ¡l, then the candidate h with the
lowest weighted number of ballots
h Ã arg min fzs; s 2 Sg
is eliminated. (Also here some pre-determined procedure must be used to break
the ties in case that jarg min fzs; s 2 Sgj > 1).
If the signed threshold l does not eliminate any candidate, then k is selected.
At the end of each iteration one candidate is either selected or eliminated. After
candidate k has been selected, the only thing to be done in the iteration is to
decrease the weights ½b of all the ballots b in Bk (those ballots in which k is the
top candidate). If we call ck the reduction factor, then
½b Ã ck½b , for every b 2 Bk
Thus the reduction factor ck, with 0 · ck · 1, is the factor reducing the ”weight”
of the candidates ranked lower than candidate k in the ballot papers (of Bk).
Expressed in an alternative manner, a ballot has a ”strength” that weakens as
it ”gets its way”, and ck measures the ”sapping by fruition”; ck larger (near 1)
means that a smaller ”price” is paid for having elected candidate k. All in all, the
candidates ranked lower in a ballot paper ”weigh” less. As an example, in the quota
electoral systems (both the closed list and ordinal ones; see below)
ck =
zk ¡ q
zk
(1)
where the quota q characteristic of each system is de…ned from the total number
jBj of valid ballots cast; so q = jBj =(n + 1) is the Droop quota, q = jBj =n is the
Hare quota and q = jBj =(n + 2) is the Imperiali quota.
In the electoral process three steps are to be considered: the nomination of
candidates, the vote and the count transforming votes into seats. In the nomination
of candidates the political parties can take more or less decision power, and the voter
be left with less or more of it. The simple parameter m measures this characteristic
of an electoral system. A scheme of a family of algorithms follows; as it is written, a
concrete algorithm is …xed when the values of the parameters n, ck and l are given
(therefore when the four parameters n, m, ck and l are given, a concrete one-round
electoral system is determined.). Each algorithm de…nes the counting process of
a one-round electoral system. Every time an algorithm is run, it is applied to a
particular instance of the problem of selecting among candidates; the instance is
determined by the two data S and B. The outcome of the algorithm is the set of
elected candidates E.
GENERAL SCHEME OF ALGORITHMS
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS: n
COUNTING PARAMETERS: l; ck
DATA OF THE INSTANCE: S; B
OUTCOME: E
STEP 1 (inicialization)
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E Ã ;;
½b Ã 1 for every b 2 B
STEP 2 (counting and pre-selection)
if S 6= ; then zs Ã
P
b2Bs
½b for every s 2 S else END;
k Ã arg max fzs; s 2 Sg;
if zk = 0 then END
STEP 3 (elimination)
if jBkj < l
then S Ã S » fkg;
go to step 2;
if zk < ¡l
then h Ã arg min fzs; s 2 Sg ;
S Ã S » fhg;
go to step 2
STEP 4 (selection)
E Ã E [ fkg; S Ã S » fkg;
½b Ã ck½b for every b 2 Bk;
if jEj < n then go to step 2 else END
Note that at the end of each iteration one candidate is either selected or elim-
inated, and thus the algorithms terminate after a …nite number of steps. If the
signed threshold l is too constraining, there is obviously the possibility that not all
the n seats are …lled.
If l ¸ 0, then only the …rst n elements of the ballot paper play a role, and so the
ballot papers may consist of lists of at most n candidates.
5. Closed list electoral systems
The parametrization covers all the standard closed list electoral systems, where
voters may only vote for closed lists proposed by political parties and the electoral
formula uses either highest average or largest remainders (…rst-past-the-post is a
particular case, with n = 1). For these electoral systems m = n and l ¸ 0. Thus
the ballot papers consist of lists of n candidates (at least n, since m = n; at most n,
since l ¸ 0). There may be a threshold or not (i.e., either l > 0 or l = 0). We shall
see that the adequate parameter ck can be determined for every standard closed
list electoral system.
Candidate k is identi…ed by the party list i where they …gure and their rank j
in that list, where i = 1; ::; jT j and j = 1; :::; n; accordingly we can write cij instead
of ck. Two possibilities are to be considered:
² The reduction factor cij depends only on j. The systems based on the highest
average method (see, e.g., Gallagher and Mitchell [4]) are obtained just setting
the parameter cij with the adequate values. For example, in the D’Hondt
system (sequence of ”divisors” 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...)
cij =
j
j + 1
,(2)
in the Sainte-Laguë system (sequence of ”divisors” 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, ...)
cij =
2j ¡ 1
2j + 1
,
8 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ AND WOLFGANG C. MÜLLER
in the Imperiali system (sequence of ”divisors” 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, ...)
cij =
j + 1
j + 2
,
and in the so-called Danish system (sequence of ”divisors” 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, ...)
cij =
3j ¡ 2
3j + 1
² The reduction factor cij depends on the rank j and on the number of votes yi
obtained by the list. This is the situation of the quota electoral systems (see
(1)), which in the case of closed lists are called largest remainders systems.
Here
cij =
yi ¡ jq
yi ¡ (j ¡ 1)q(3)
Note that highest average systems are de…ned only for closed list voting, whereas
quota systems do not have this restriction.
We introduce some general notation for closed list electoral systems (with m = n
and l ¸ 0). As a motivation, consider the usual table to allocate the seats by
D’Hondt system (without threshold), in a numerical example (with n = 10) taken
from Gallagher and Mitchell [4]:
Votes (V ) (1=2) ¢ V (1=3) ¢ V (1=4) ¢ V (1=5) ¢ V Seats
Socialist Party 34,000 17,000 11,333 8,500 6,800 4
Center-right Party 25,000 12,500 8,333 3
Liberal Party 15,000 7,500 1
Green Party 12,000 6,000 1
Radical Right Party 10,000 5,000 1
Regionalist Party 4,000
TOTAL 100,000 10
This table, taking aside the last row and the last column, provides a 6 £ 5 matrix,
making up the …rst 5 columns of an instance of the matrix of the electoral system,
as we shall call it. The matrix is calculated stepwise by the algorithm. The n
largest entries of the matrix (here boxed) are also worked out; only the entries of
the matrix that may be relevant for this purpose are calculated.
Let ¿ := jT j be the number of competing lists. Any candidate s is identi…ed by
the party list i where they …gure and their rank j in that list, where i = 1; ::; ¿
and j = 1; :::; n; accordingly we can write zij instead of zs. Note that in closed list
electoral systems, the value of zs de…ned in Step 2 can be trivial (i.e. de…ned by
an empty sum) or non-trivial; once it is de…ned non-trivially, it does not change in
subsequent iterations. Suppose that l = 0 (or that the candidates to be eliminated
by the threshold l have already been excluded). Given a closed list electoral system
(algorithm) and a distribution of votes y = (y1; y2; :::; y¿ ), where yi is the number
of votes obtained by party i , we de…ne the matrix of the electoral system (for
y), Y = (yij), i = 1; :::; ¿ , j = 1; :::; n as follows: yij is the non-trivial value
(as provided by the algorithm) of zij (whether the non-trivial values are actually
determined in the implementation of a particular instance depends on when the
algorithm terminates). Thus the …rst column is just vector y (so yi1 := yi for every
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party i = 1; :::; ¿), and the rest of the columns are given by
yij := ci(j¡1) ¢ ci(j¡2) ¢ ::: ¢ ci2 ¢ ci1 ¢ yi , for i = 1; :::; ¿ , j = 2; :::; n(4)
The algorithm …nds the n highest entries of the matrix Y , and the corresponding
candidates are selected to represent the constituency.
The matrices of closed list electoral systems are used in Gutiérrez [6] to study
in a uni…ed way whether an electoral system is more or less favourable to large or
small parties.
Let us consider matrix Y in these two cases: the highest average systems and
the largest remainders systems. In highest average systems the reduction factor
cij depends only on the rank j in the party list, and thus the columns of Y are
proportional to the …rst column (the distribution of votes y)1. On the other hand,
in largest remainders systems every column of Y is the result of adding a constant
to all the elements of the …rst column2. Note that the two sorts of standard closed
list electoral systems, highest average and largest remainders systems, represent the
two simplest and more ”natural” ways of deriving the matrix Y from vector y, the
former multiplicative and the latter additive.
We have just seen an example of Y for highest average systems. As an example
for largest remainders systems, consider the following table (not the usual one ap-
pearing in books) to allocate the seats by the Hare quota according to the algorithm
(wihout threshold), with the same data (for the D’Hondt system) as above:
Votes (V) V¡q V¡2q V¡3q Seats
Socialist Party 34,000 24,000 14,000 4,000 3
Center-right Party 25,000 15,000 5,000 3
Liberal Party 15,000 5,000 2
Green Party 12,000 2,000 1
Radical Right Party 10,000 0 1
Regionalist Party 4,000
TOTAL 100,000 10
This table, taking aside the last row and the last column, provides the …rst 4
columns of an instance of the matrix of the electoral system (only the relevant
entries are calculated).
In real world closed list systems, often a threshold is imposed: only the candidates
of the lists with a number of votes greater than l > 0 are considered (e.g., 3% in
Spain3 (Congreso de los Diputados), 4% in Austria (Nationalrat) or 5% in Germany
(Bundestag)). On the other hand, it is sometimes possible for the voters to intervene
in the setting of the order of candidates in the party list through an additional voting
1In highest average systems cij =: ·j , i = 1; :::; ¿ , and
yij = ·j¡1 ¢ ::: ¢ ·2 ¢ ·1 ¢ yi , for i = 1; :::; ¿ , j = 2; :::; n
2From (4) and (3), after an easy calculation, it results for largest remainders systems deter-
mined by quota q that
yij := yi ¡ (j ¡ 1)q , for i = 1; :::; ¿ , j = 2; :::; n
3Considering the magnitude of the constituencies, this threshold has very limited signi…cance
in the Spanish system (and it can be e¤ective only in the constituencies of Madrid and Barcelona).
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process; this is the case in Germany, where only after considering the so-called ”…rst
vote” the order of the candidates in the lists of the parties is established4.
6. Ordinal electoral systems
In ordinal electoral systems the voter can rank in the ballot paper the candidates,
irrespective of their party, in any order he/she wishes. The parametrization covers
all single transferable vote systems (preferential voting is a particular case), which
are the main ordinal systems. In principle, there is a single transferable vote system
for every possible quota q; normally the Droop quota is used (see below).
The higher the threshold is, the more candidates are eliminated. The political
e¤ect of the threshold is more nuanced in ordinal systems than in closed list sys-
tems. We consider ordinal single transferable vote systems. On the one hand, the
higher the threshold is, the more candidates with low preferences in the ballots are
eliminated, and this goes in principle against small parties. On the other hand,
when a candidate is eliminated, the second choices in the ballots where this candi-
date was the …rst option come to the fore (in contrast with the threshold of closed
list systems, where the ballots of the parties failing at the threshold simply become
ine¤ectual). The …nal e¤ect depends on the distribution of second choices (third
choices, etc). Middle sized parties were predicted to bene…t from the introduction
of the simplest of this sort of electoral systems, the defeated proposal of alternative
voting in Britain (in force in Australia under the name of preferential voting), with
single member constituencies and absolute majority as threshold (see Sanders et al.
[10]).
For single transferable vote systems m = 1 and l < 0. In fact, we shall ex-
plain how the single transferable vote system with quota q is determined by the
parameters l = ¡q and
ck =
zk ¡ q
zk
Note that the quota is used to de…ne both ck and the threshold ¡l. In order to
avoid being too abstract in the explanation, we consider the Irish single transferable
vote system in some detail . Here the voter provides the maximum of information:
T = S¤ (certainly the voters may refrain from listing all the candidates). The
magnitude n of the constituencies is 3, 4 or 5. Now l = ¡q, where q = jBj =(n + 1)
is the Droop quota. In every iteration the selection of a candidate is attempted; if
no candidate can be selected in this iteration, one candidate is eliminated. If k is
selected, the weight ½b of the ballots in the set Bk (formed by the ballots in which
k is the top candidate among those still in S) is decreased by the factor ck =
zk¡q
zk
.
Alternatively, without using weights, a random sample (of the corresponding size) of
ballots of Bk is taken, and the rest of the ballots of Bk are discarded. Either simple
sampling or strati…ed sampling (with proportional allocation) can be applied; in
the latter case the strata are de…ned according to the candidate (in S) following k
in the ballots. In the long run, weighting (called ”Gregory method”) and sampling
are equivalent; in practice strati…ed sampling is used in Ireland.
4The …rst vote is applied to single-seat constituencies (…rst-past-the post). The candidates so
elected for each party are now to be considered at the top of the corresponding party list (whether
they were also candidates in the party list or not). Those elected with the …rst vote become
members of the Bundestag even if they are not elected with the vote for the party lists (the ”second
vote”); the size of the Bundestag is increased accordingly (excess seats or ”Überhangmandate”).
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Consider the following table, with n = 3 (the data are taken from Gallagher and
Mitchell [4]). In the …rst iteration, no candidate can be selected and O’Riordan
is eliminated (¡l = 8352). Now his name plays no further part in all ballots, and
thus the 3,796 ballots where he is in the top position are ”transferred” according to
the second preferences shown on them (in 287 ballots only the name of O’Riordan
comes up; these are ”non-transferable ballots”). In the second iteration, Crowley is
selected. Now cCROWLEY = 1668518 , and the algorithm assigns the weight
166
8518
to all
ballots where Crowley is the …rst preference (½b Ã cCROW LEY ¢ 1); alternatively,
as in the table, 166 of these ballots are chosen with strati…ed sampling (the appor-
tionment for the 4 strata is given by the distribution of the 8,518 Crowley’s ballots:
5,644 for Creed, 564 for Moynihan, 1,232 for Roche , and 1,078 non-transferable),
and the remaining 8,352 are put aside of the counting. Creed is selected in the
third iteration, and Moynihan in the fourth one.
1st PREF. TRANSF. TRANSF.
Creed 7,037 +1,292 8,349 +110 8,469
Crowley 7,431 +1,087 8,518 -166
Moynihan 7,777 +566 8,343 +11 8,354
O’Riordan 3,796 -3,796
Roche 7,343 +564 7,907 +24 7,931
NON-TRANSF. +287 287 +21 308
TOTAL 33,404
In fact, when a candidate is selected a variant of the procedure above is used in
Ireland. Strati…ed sampling is not implemented in Bk, but in a subset V µ Bk.
Thus when Crowley is selected, V is formed by those ballots transferred to Crowley
after the elimination of O’Riordan, excluding those having no preference after the
names of O’Riordan and Crowley (non-transferable). The distribution of these
1,087 ballots is: 783 for Creed, 72 for Moynihan, 145 for Roche , and 87 non-
transferable. The proportions of Creed, Moynihan and Roche of the 1,087-87=1,000
ballots provide now the apportionment for the 3 strata, as shown in the table below.
1st PREF. TRANSF. TRANSF.
Creed 7,037 +1,292 8,349 +130 8,479
Crowley 7,431 +1,087 8,518 -166 8,352
Moynihan 7,777 +566 8,343 +12 8,355
O’Riordan 3,796 -3,796
Roche 7,343 +564 7,907 +24 7,931
NON-TRANSF. +287 287 +0 287
TOTAL 33,404
When in the algorithm selection and elimination are carried out, usually non-
transferable ballots appear. For simplicity, we have supposed that there are enough
transferable ballots for all seats to be allocated with the algorithm.
7. Conclusions
This article has introduced a family of algorithms; it provides a formalization
of how the ”basic one-round electoral systems” proceed in transforming votes into
seats. In this way the basic one-round electoral systems, including the standard
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closed list systems and the single transferable vote ordinal systems, are parame-
trized with the four parameters n (size of the constituency), m (size of the nom-
ination lists), ck (a factor providing the electoral formula) and l (signed election
threshold).
Other electoral systems beyond the standard closed list systems and the single
transferable vote ordinal systems are within the parametrization. For example, the
single non-transferable vote results by setting m = 1, l = 0 and ck = 0. (Thus only
the …rst element of the ballot paper plays a role, and consequently only one name
has to appear in the ballot).
Statistical inference provides a good example of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of parametrization. On the one hand, in parametric statistics the theoretical
analysis and the empirical testing are made easier. On the other hand, these very
advantages make tempting to assume hypotheses allowing to work parametrically,
even when the topic under consideration does not justify su¢ciently these hypothe-
ses.
Here we see that it is not necessary to formulate additional assumptions in order
to parametrize the basic one-round electoral systems5. The parametrization reveals
that the usual electoral systems have a common basic structure. They di¤er indeed
in the amount of information gathered in the ballot paper and the consequent
e¤ect of the thresholds. In closed list systems, if a candidate is eliminated by
the threshold, all the members of the list are also eliminated, whereas in single
transferable vote ordinal systems, with the ballots having more information, we
have somebody to resort to if a candidate is eliminated: the candidate in the ballot
paper following the one crossed out.
In the electoral process three steps are to be considered: the nomination of
candidates, the vote and the count transforming votes into seats. In the nomination
of candidates the political parties can take more or less decision power, and the voter
be left with less or more of it. The simple parameter m measures this characteristic
of an electoral system. The parametrization of two-round electoral systems and
that of the nomination of candidates by primaries (closed, open or blanket) may be
a further research topic.
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